CVE-2026-98802
Our Analysis: Environment Specific
Our model has classified this vulnerability as relevant to Environment Specific Systems, helping your team prioritize efforts effectively.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA
advance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6
destination address without ensuring the packet data is writable.
seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the
NEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.
The skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on
the ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg()
then write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that
socket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The
simplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():
__netif_receive_skb_one_core
__netif_receive_skb_core
deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0]
packet_rcv
skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket
consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1]
ipv6_rcv
ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1]
[...]
input_action_end_core
advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone
Call skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in
seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data.
skb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb->head, which invalidates the
pointers into the packet data taken before the call.
advance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if
skb_ensure_writable() fails.
seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination
address from the skb after skb_ensure_writable().
On failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM.